What to expect: Running Backs 2012

Previously: Quarterbacks

Projected Starter: Fitzgerald Toussaint
After his 1,000 yard season last year, everyone knew Fitz Toussaint was Michigan's running back in 2012, the first established starter since Mike Hart left in 2007. Unfortunately, Fitz went and got himself a DUI and now his status with the team (in reality, just for the first few games) is in question. The chances are he misses the opener against Alabama or at least the first half of the game, depending on Hoke's disciplinary decisions, but we'll go forward assuming Fitz will retain his starting role once he's fully reinstated to the team.

Fitz didn't really break out until the Purdue game last year after he was given only two carries the week prior against Michigan State. He turned in solid performances against Western Michigan, Minnesota, and San Diego State early in the year, but none of those defenses showed much resistance; Fitz's performances could be written off as promising games against sub-par competition. After the MSU debacle, Fitz closed the regular season with 678 yards on 112 carries (6.05 yards/carry) until running into the Virginia Tech defense in the bowl game (30 yards on 13 carries).

Fitz has all of the traits you could want in a primary back: good vision, strong cuts, the ability to make people miss, ball security, and the strength to push the pile forward. Though not the workhorse that Mike Hart was, Fitz is a more complete back, and paired with Denard in the backfield, he presents a pick-your-poison proposition for defenses. Because opponents didn't want to risk Denard carrying the ball, that resulted in a lot of set-up blocking and open lanes for Fitz last year.

Barring a long suspension, Fitz should continue down the road he ended last season on: 5.5 to 6 yards/carry throughout the year and 15-20 carries a game. Even if he misses a game or two due to suspension, Fitz will likely surpass 1,000 yards this year, but won't get much higher than that.

The Backups: Vincent Smith, Thomas Rawls

With Fitz likely out for some or all of the Alabama game, the rushing load will fall on senior Vincent Smith and sophomore Thomas Rawls.

Preposterous though this may sound, Smith is probably the X-factor against Alabama if Fitz can't play--and probably even if he can. Though Fitz has proven to be a great ball carrier, Smith brings something to the table that no other back on Michigan's roster can: the ability to catch balls out of the backfield. Alabama's defensive line is going to nullify the advantage Michigan's offensive line will have against most teams, so the ability to keep the defense honest and account for a scat back coming out of the backfield could be valuable.

People have underrated Smith for the last year because of Toussaint's performances, but Smith was a dangerous back both carrying the ball and catching it under Rodriguez. Because of the Denardness of the 2010 offense, however, Smith has only garnered more than 15 carries twice in his career: against Purdue in 2010 and Delaware State in 2009. Smith is an exceptional blocker, but he can also make people miss in a phone booth. His ability to flex out as a slot receiver, catch balls from the backfield, and underrated running abilities make him a serious threat against teams (namely Alabama, the only team that he'll get significant touches against).

Next off the bench is Thomas Rawls. After the spring game, most spectators were convinced that Rawls is the future, but this won't be his year. My reaction following the spring game:

Thomas Rawls wins the annual Spring Game award for Most Impressive Player Likely to Spend the Season on the Bench. Rawls is a power runner that showed good vision and an ability to get upfield. This year still belongs to Fitz Toussaint, though. Rawls will be a good option when Toussaint needs a breather, but he doesn't offer much that Fitz doesn't already bring to the table. The biggest concern with Rawls isn't even about his play: I'm worried the coaches will try and revive the I-formation running game behind Rawls' shoulder pads. As we saw once again in the spring game, this team is ill-equipped to run from the I formation.

Those I-formation fears will be diminished next year when the Shane Morris show comes to town and the team plays from under center more, but this year, any I-formation running is conceding defeat. Rawls will be the short yardage back this year (with occasional appearances by bowling ball fumbleback Stephen Hopkins) but won't get more than 5 carries against any team that's not an early-season cupcake or late-season blowout. While promising, Rawls is still unproven, and though his spring game performance was impressive, it's still just a spring game.

The rest of the guys on the roster are just that: on the roster. The incoming freshmen (Dennis Norfleet and Drake Johnson) will spend the season on the bench, and redshirt freshman Justice Hayes is buried behind a bunch of competent-to-great backs already. Hayes might get some burn against Air Force and UMass, but otherwise, he'll spend the season riding the pine unless things go terrible wrong.

What to expect: Quarterbacks 2012

Russell Bellomy (aka Poor Man's Tate), a wide receiver, and Denard

Projected Starter: The Man Known by One Name
Prior to last year's season, I tried to project how Denard would fare based on his performance from the previous year on passing downs. The results:

Denard Robinson	Completion %	YPA	Passing Yards	TD/INT	YPC	Rushing Yards
2010	62.50%	8.8	2,570	18/11	6.6	1,702
Projected 2011	59%	7.5	1,950	15/15	7	900
Actual 2011	55%	8.4	2,173	20/15	5.3	1,176

Though his numbers dropped noticeably from his 2010 highs, the projected numbers, while pessimistic, were closer than not. The shift away from Rich Rodriguez's Denard-first offense saw #16's stats dip significantly, no more so than in his completion percentage and rushing numbers, both of which were to be expected as the team transitioned to a more "traditional" offense.

The good news: Michigan went 11-2 last year with Denard under center. The bad news: I don't expect him to improve much--if at all--this year, and Michigan's schedule becomes significantly more difficult.

Though Denard showed an uncanny ability to get lucky last year, his Leaping Leprechaun (Junior Hemingway) has departed for the NFL leaving him with Rodriguez's surplus of slot receivers to fight for downfield jumpballs. These will, predictably, not end as well as they did last year, when Hemingway was able to pull down seemingly everything thrown his way. Not only hasn't any Michigan receiver shown an ability to go up and fight for balls like Hemingway, but few even have the size to do so. The only hope is for Devin Gardner's (not pictured above) wide receiver potential to be fully realized early in the year.

Even with Hemingway's services, Denard's interceptions jumped last year. Much of this was from ill-fated passes thrown under pressure, but he also locked onto receivers and threw into double coverage... a lot. Though he only had three games where he threw multiple interceptions (ND, SDSU, Northwestern), Denard also avoided giving the ball away in only three games (Western Michigan, Minnesota, OSU). Al Borges is aware of these problems. From his book "Coaching the West Coast Quarterback", there's a section called "Cause of Interceptions" which lists...

• Forcing the ball into coverage; not taking what the defense gives; not seeing throwing lanes.
• Late throws in the middle of the defense.
• Panic throws under pressure (e.g., desperately avoiding a sack).
• Under-thrown deep balls. (The quarterback should throw it where only the good guy can get it.)
• Throwing the ball in traffic with poor weight transfer (i.e., against a big pass rush).

...among other things. You could lump most of Denard's bad passes last year into at least one of those categories. Unfortunately, those rules are independent of Borges' system. Those are passes that every quarterback knows not to make. Entering his third year as a starter and his senior season, if Denard hasn't already learned not to make those throws, he probably never will learn. Count on Denard to average about an interception--to 1.5--per game.

That's the pessimistic angle (the one that makes more sense in my brain) though. The other side of the coin is Denard, Heisman Contender. While I think that's possible, he's going to need to show significant mprovement over last year while playing a more difficult schedule (don't undersell this as a potential explanation for a lack of improvement from Denard). I've never seen a quarterback go from Year 1 to Year 2 under Borges/Hoke, so I'm not really sure what to expect. Early camp reports say Denard is playing extremely well, but camp reports are camp reports. Can Denard surpass his numbers from last year? Yes, but he won't come close to his breakout 2010 season, the kind of numbers he would need really lock down the Heisman.

Realistically, given the lack of wide receiver talent (about which more later this week), Denard's totals will probably remain the same while things like his yards per attempt drop as his deep jump balls increasingly fall to the turn.

The Backups: Not a Wide Receiver, Russell Bellomy
With Devin Gardner finally (finally!) moving to wide receiver, hopefully for good, we can all agree that his time under center at Michigan is over. Despite his exceptional athletic gifts and dual-threatness, he possesses all of the mechanical problems Denard does without two years of playing time and proven performances. He will bolster a wide receiving corps that is in desperate need of playmakers.

If/when Denard does come out of the game, he'll be relieved by redshirt freshman Russell Bellomy, a three-star dual threat type out of Texas. I call him a poor man's Tate Forcier because, well, he is: a scrambly, pass-first type lacking top-end athleticism or arm strength. Bellomy looked Totally Serviceable in the spring game this year throwing dump down passes. I said after the spring game:

Russell Bellomy came in as the nominal #2 quarterback. Despite my desire to see Gardner move to wide receiver, I'm not sure I want Bellomy as Denard's backup. He showed good pocket presence and some ability to make plays, but he has a high school arm and only decent accuracy. He's not a quality backup yet.

Unfortunately, that's probably where Michigan is at this year. Sacrifice all of your spare goats for Denard's health lest Michigan turn into Purdue with a better offensive line. Should Bellomy have to go in for an extended period of time this year, expect lots of under center, I-formation hand offs and roll outs. Bellomy may have the skillset to run the traditional West Coast offense with quick slants and hitches, but that will only get this team so far. It's Denard or bust, but it's been that way for the last two years already.

The return

Seeing as fall camp has officially started and I haven't written anything here in over two months--and nothing about football since April--it may be time for an update.

In the last few weeks, I moved from the sunny concrete jungle of West Los Angeles and have returned to Michigan to pursue my graduate degree at U of M--FWIW, I'm going to the School of Information. What this means for the blog moving forward is uncertain. No, I will not be attending press conferences and reporting on them. For that, you can continue visiting MGoBlog or whatever source of actual reporting you frequent. I'm expecting my course load to put a strain on my free time and hence my ability to post daily updates, but we'll see whether or not that's the case. Currently, my biggest obstacle is my new computer and lack of Adobe Photoshop (no Wet Owls? ps, Fall Camp!) and Illustrator (those play diagrams that have become my bread and butter around here). I'm working on getting those but as a broke, unemployed student, getting the Adobe suite is tough.

As for any new content that you might want to read, my review of NCAA 13 went up on PopMatters today (we're very timely there). I don't think the game is very good. The money quote:

It’s clear that barring a massive upgrade in AI development in the next few years, EA’s football series is kind of stuck, a problem largely brought on by the rules of football more so than any failing of the developer. The main issue facing football video games currently is that there are too many players. Each team fields 11 men, but the player only controls one, meaning the outcome of any play is dependent on whether or not your AI wide receiver can get open against AI cornerbacks, for example. There are obviously considerations with regards to play calls—running man-beating passing routes against man coverage and vice versa—but anyone who has ever played an EA football game knows that there are just times when the game decides that you’re not winning. And these problems extend beyond the skill position players: if your offensive linemen are unable to block the defensive line, your play call hardly matters.

That's it for now. As news starts to float out from practice, I'll start posting more regularly. If there's anything you want to see me cover, let me know via e-mail or in the comments. Otherwise, welcome back. Go Blue!

On Westbrook, 43 points, and the Heat defense

Ed. note: Another non-Michigan related post. I promise I'll start writing about it more once camp swings back into focus.

This post won't surprise anyone who follows my Twitter account, but I'm pretty invested in the NBA finals and in particular, Lebron James (who yes, I am rooting for). I've told many people, even if you don't like basketball, watch these finals; they are culturally important in a way that sporting events rarely are.

Aside from James being one win away from his first NBA title, the storyline after game four was Russell Westbrook's 43-point explosion, the kind of performance that the point guard is capable of but a plateau that NBA players rarely achieve. While most talking heads and Twitter were gushing over his performance, I couldn't help but feel unimpressed (?).

What Westbrook achieved yesterday was a cut throat scoring performance, but its brilliance was overshadowed both by the Thunder's eventual loss and because of what Rajon Rondo accomplished in the previous series against the Heat: an outing in which he scored more points and doubled Westbrook's assist total from last night. I don't mean to imply that because Rondo did it, Russell's output was less impressive, but I do think it's critical to look at precisely how both of these players put up such gaudy numbers; if you ask Magic Johnson, he'll tell you these were two of the greatest playoff performances ever, which if it were true, you'd expect at least one of their respective teams to come away with a win. To wit, look at the shot charts from the games in question:

For anyone who cares about things like shot distribution, the massive amount of mid-range jumpers that each player took is troublesome. Though both players live at the rim, each took an overwhelming number of shots from the 12- to 20-foot range that NBA defenses are begging players--especially Rondo and Westbrook--to take.

11 of Westbrook's 20 made baskets came outside the paint in game 4, and zero of them came from beyond the three point line. Russell went 11/13 from the least efficient areas on a basketball court, 0/3 from the outside, and 9/16 in the paint. Similarly, Rondo hit 11/14 shots from outside the restricted area, including two long threes that he hit at the end of overtime. He was 5/10 in the paint.

These numbers aren't particularly illuminating if you didn't watch the games, however. Since Rondo and Westbrook present almost no threat from the three point line, on pick-and-roll defense, the Miami Heat defenders always go under the screener, opening up shots for the ball handler. And given their lack of shooting consistency and superior performance at the rim--drawing fouls, kicking the ball to open shooters, etc--the Heat opt to pack the lane and force mid-range jump shots. In two games this postseason, the player that Miami baits into taking long twos has gotten hot. Neither player's team won.

Now look at Westbrook's shooting distribution through games one, two and three of this series:

You see similar concentrations in the same shooting areas as game four, but rather than a bunch of orange circles, the courts are peppered with those troublesome Xs. The thing people seem unwilling to admit about Westbrook's game 4 performance (much like Rondo's 44-point game) is that Russell didn't hit very many difficult shots or work particularly hard to get the openings that he had. Throughout the series and against the Celtics before them, the Heat are practically begging Westbrook to take his signature mid-range jumper, not because he can't hit it, but because it gives the Heat its best chance to counteract an otherwise lethal offense.

Off the top of your head, how many times last night did you see the Thunder move the ball around the offensive zone like they did against the Spurs? In the Western Conference Finals, the Thunder were playing together at an extraordinary level, which prompted some people to think they'd blow through the Heat in the finals. But when the ball lands in Westbrook's hand on the pick and roll, the Heat are giving him what he thinks are easy points. Except the Heat can keep pace--and they know it--when the Thunder are taking jump shots, especially two-point jump shots off the dribble.

The Thunder are deadliest when they're moving the ball consistently and getting open looks from the corner, getting out in transition, and getting to the line for three-point plays. When Westbrook is taking 15-foot jumpers off a pick and roll with 15 seconds left on the shot clock, regardless of whether or not he makes 84% of them (like he did last night), the Heat can respond. This disruption of the Thunder offense has had obvious effects: James Harden isn't getting the open looks he has all season--his shooting has collapsed--and neither is Kevin Durant.

Something that's being overshadowed from Westbrook's 43-point performance? He took only three free throw attempts on 32 field goal tries. Especially for a player like Westbrook, who's most effective at the rim, this lack of production takes a serious toll. He took about 39% of the Thunder's field goal attempts in game 4, most of which could score no more than 2 points. He hit a lot of them, so the Thunder held serve and Westbrook put up gaudy numbers, but this is not the Thunder's best offense.

Any time Westbrook does something wrong, people are up in arms that Kevin Durant didn't get enough shots. There might be some truth to that in this instance despite both of their monster performances. Durant scored 28 points on 19 shots, and crucially took 9 free throws throughout the game. In game 4, a tradeoff between Durant and Westbrook isn't just two points for Durant vs. two points for Westbrook. Rather, it's Durant's ability to get two or three versus a 45% chance (his season shooting average) of two points for Westbrook on an open, albeit inefficient, look. That or the Thunder begin to move the ball more rapidly in the offensive zone, opening up looks for their other scorers.

The other thing that's gone unmentioned: The 33 points poured on by Heat punching bag Mario Chalmers and Norris "Flat Top" Cole, due in large part to Westbrook's porous defense (though Scott Brooks deserves some blame here as well). John Hollinger pointed this out in a column a few months ago, but the Thunder struggle to defend the paint because their perimeter defense allows too many blow bys:

The Thunder gave up 72 points in the paint Sunday, and Ibaka blocked 11 other shots, nearly all of which were sure-fire baskets. Think about that for a second. That's potentially 94 points in the paint.

Paint points have been a season-long problem for Oklahoma City, which is only 14th overall in defensive efficiency. As Ibaka showed against Denver, the Thunder's problem isn't an inability to contest shots in the paint, nor is it an inability to defend the post. It's all those blow-bys on the perimeter, which constantly leave the bigs in recovery mode.

And because their bigs are always chasing down drivers, it leads to another opening on the boards. Despite what on paper should be a very solid rebounding team, Oklahoma City is tied for 23rd in defensive rebound rate at 72.2 percent. Again, those 11 blocks are indicative -- every time Ibaka rotates to close down the lane, it leaves the boards open for seconds shots. Transition defense, as the Thunder showed, is also a problem.

That trend was in full force in game four. Though part of that was Scott Brooks ignoring the Heat guards and focusing on Lebron, Wade, and Shane Battier's three point shooting, the Heat guards are nowhere near Westbrook's skill level and they torched him on that side of the floor.

If Rondo hadn't previously put up nearly identical (and better) numbers, it might be easier to accept Westbrook's performance as an awe-inspiring. But if you're closely watching these playoffs, you'll notice that the Heat are begging opposing players (at least those without the ability to consistently stretch the floor) to take these mid-range jumpers with the assumption that Lebron, Wade, and countless open three pointers will be able to counteract a performance like Westbrook's. Gaudy numbers don't equal wins and Erik Spoelstra should get more credit for disrupting a more efficient Thunder offense and turning it into a one-man show.

Spurs offense versus the Thunder

I haven't been particularly inspired by sports lately, at least until I saw the San Antonio Spurs' dismemberment of the Oklahoma City Thunder's defense last night. What was most interesting was that for a majority of the game--and especially in the third quarter--the Spurs ran the exact same offensive play (a high pick and roll) and the Thunder never once adjusted.

The Spurs offense worked both because of floor spacing and because the ball carrier always had at least two options. As long as he made the right decision with the ball, which a group full of veterans like the Spurs are wont to do, the offense would produce a clean look, usually a corner three. The basic setup for the play looked like this:

The screener was typically Tim Duncan, but always a big man, and the ball carrier was usually Tony Parker. First, take note of the floor spacing. The Spurs have two shooters in the short corners and a third shooter on one side of the floor. The pick and roll was almost always directed toward the side of the floor with two players, about which more later. Once Parker would get over the screen, Duncan would roll to the basket:

At this point, Parker has two options: drop the ball to Duncan who is cutting toward the basket or take the ball to the rim himself. This is where the Thunder's defensive adjustments (or lack thereof) failed miserably. They refused to switch on the pick and roll (not a horrible idea), but the on-ball defender (we'll say Russell Westbrook) always went over the screen, meaning he was immediately in a trailing position. If the man defending Duncan shows on Parker, then Parker dumps the ball to Duncan rolling to the basket. If Duncan's defender stays with him, Parker attacks with Westbrook already on his back.

The real problem is that the Thunder didn't have a defensive strategy for this, which usually meant that both options were open. Toward the end of the game, they started to trap Parker high, but that didn't work particularly well because Duncan would just slip the screen and the trap was half-hearted at best. The real brilliance of this offensive design doesn't become apparent until Parker makes the slip pass to Duncan though:

As I mentioned before, the pick and roll always went toward the side of the floor with two Spur players. Once Parker dumps the ball off to Duncan, he has a relatively clear lane to the basket. His defender had to slow Parker from driving into the lane and is now in a trailing position on Duncan. This requires help defense. Since Parker originally drove toward the side of the floor with two Spurs shooters, after Duncan slips the screen, he's running down the backside with only one Thunder defender who has a choice to make: come off his man in the corner to stop the drive or else concede an open layup. Now you can see the two options Duncan has: drive to the lane if the help defense remains on the corner shooter or kick the ball out if they pack the lane.

That's it. And I mean, the whole game. Watch the first three plays here. Despite the fact that Westbrook gets the block on the first, they are all the exact same play:



The Spurs ran that play all game and the Thunder never adjusted to it. I don't know that I've ever seen a team so hopelessly lost against a single play. You go to a zone defense. You play ball denial on Parker all the way down the court (you'd rather have him taking a corner three than Ginobili, for example). You trap hard on the pick and roll. You do anything. Scott Brooks watched as the Spurs turned into the Harlem Globetrotters against his incredibly young and talented squad.

If the Thunder are going to have any chance in this series, they're going to need to figure out how to defend this single, basic play. Fortunately for them, they have plenty of game film to correct their problems.